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Section 1: Thinking about participation with ANT 
In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour (2005a) describes the defining moment of ANT as that 
when three social theorists (John Law, Michel Callon and himself) each managed to persuade 
others that three objects formerly understood to be non-social (respectively: reefs, scallops and 
microbes) could be described as associated with social entities.1 The concept of association 
inspired detailed redescriptions of such objects, in ways which showed that ‘they make others do 
unexpected things’ (2005a: 106). The work of the analyst, as these authors saw it, was to get 
closer to entities that were traditionally seen as non-social, follow them and trace, in minute 
detail, their relations, translations and mediations. In order to do this, the very meaning of the 
social and the natural would need to be ‘dissolved simultaneously’ (Latour 2005a: 109). 
These early iterations of ANT worked primarily to produce better accounts of how scientific 
knowledge was made: The socio-material practices that went into creating indisputable ‘facts’ 
which were accepted as existing ‘out there’ in an ontological world that existed independent of 
human agency. This core orientation has significant implications for experiments in 
participation. In a world where scientific and political controversies are often inseparable (e.g. 
climate change, GM foods, avian flu, tobacco, human reproduction, etc.), attempts to unsettle 
‘natural’ facts are vital to the tricky task of participating in contemporary democratic politics.  
In this chapter, we will outline the basics of an ANT approach to participation. We begin with a 
discussion of three key texts: Callon, Lascoume and Barthe’s (2009) Acting in an Uncertain 
World, Latour’s (2004) Politics of Nature and Latour’s chapter (2005b) From Realpolitik to 
Dingpolitik (published in Weibel and Latour’s 2005 Making Things Public: Atmospheres of 
Democracy). These texts spark readers to reimagine the spaces, procedures and philosophies in 
play around technoscientific controversies in public life. The insights of ANT, their authors 
believed, could address the proliferation of such controversies, and contribute to better 
democratising democracy. Through subtly different but overlapping argumentation, they 
advocated: 
- intervening in technical and scientific knowledge-making; 
- opening out the idea of expertise through the championing of different understandings;  
- reconfiguring lay and expert knowledges in research;  
- building new evidence; 
- creating ‘spaces’ or ‘collectives’ where people and things might gather together to discuss, 
differ and dispute; and 
- supporting an explicitly experimental mode of engagement around controversy. 
 
In each of the texts, the authors established specific ideas about how to achieve the 
aforementioned. We outline these in section 1. Then, in section 2, we explore the performance of 
these ideas ‘in the wild’ through an experimental participatory collective formed around blue-
green algae in a lake, Loweswater, in Cumbria, Northern England. After that, in sections 3 and 4, 
we query what a subsequent project, which looks at how farmers make decisions about the 
management of cattle slurry,2 can tell us about moving beyond these approaches in rethinking 
participatory experiments in the spirit of ANT. 
Science in the wild: hybrid forums 
We begin our whirlwind tour of an ANT approach to participation with the ideas of Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) in Acting in an Uncertain World. Here, Callon and colleagues 
advocate for widening participation in the socio-material construction of scientific knowledge 
via 'hybrid forums.’ Participation is seen by these authors as an appropriate response to 
ontological uncertainty and scientific controversy. They advocate a ‘technical democracy’ – one 
where political institutions are expanded and improved, to open out controversies through 
inclusive, public collaborations in knowledge-making and research. 
A hybrid forum (henceforth HyFo) is a group that comes together to address a problem. The 
HyFo is hybrid both because the members are heterogeneous (scientists; politicians; interested 
laypersons), and the problem is addressed in many different domains (technological; ethical; 
economic). It is a forum because it creates an open, public space for debate, from which no one 
(and no subject) is excluded. A HyFo’s members explicitly recognise that knowledge creation – 
even knowledge creation concerning the natural world – is inherently a political act. That is, it 
involves a politics performed through (public) dialogue, rather than delegation to political 
professionals or elected officials. HyFos are therefore based on collective experimentation and 
learning. They scramble the division between laypersons and officially appointed experts. This 
makes the HyFo a ‘normatively oriented space’ and one that has specific ‘dialogic procedures’ 
(Callon et al. 2009: 161). 
Both the socio-material construction of science and the political implications of this construction 
are explicitly recognised in the HyFo, and participation in knowledge creation is extended 
beyond the milieu of the expert. Science leaves the protected space of the laboratory and goes 
‘into the wild.’ Clear-cut decisions – the arrival at a final and absolute truth – are not necessarily 
the desired outcome of the HyFo; instead, a favourable outcome is an ongoing ‘series of 
rendezvous’ (2009: 223), repeated meetings that make provisional decisions, open to change as 
information, circumstances or priorities change. In Acting in an Uncertain World, Callon et al. 
lay out guidelines for how the successful HyFo should be both executed and evaluated. 
The participatory non-human: the Parliament of Things 
Further contributions to ANT participatory thinking are found in Latour’s (2004) book Politics of 
Nature and in extensions of his arguments there in the essay ‘From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or 
how to make things public,’ written for the exhibition catalogue Making Things Public (Weibel 
and Latour 2005). In Politics of Nature, Latour proposes a ‘new constitution’ to do away with the 
‘illicit’ divide of nature (as represented by Science – note the capital ’S’) and society (aka 
Politics). This new constitution would allow participants in democracies to work towards a 
‘common world,’ not split into society and nature, where both humans (society, the realm of 
politics) and non-human ‘things’ (nature, the realm of science) are afforded due to political 
process. This, in other words, is a vision of an enlarged democracy in which the hybridity of 
nature-society is recognised. In his later elaboration of this argument, Latour suggested that 
‘Dings,’ where ‘the Ding designates both those who assemble because they are concerned as well 
as what causes their concerns and divisions,’ needed to be brought back into politics (2005b: 8, 
our emphasis). Dings, Latour argued, should become the centre of attention in what he called an 
‘object-oriented democracy’ (2005b: 8). 
Dingpolitik, or the ‘parliament of things,’ involves a vital move whereby participants in 
democracies start to work around ‘matters of concern’ rather than ‘matters of fact.’ For Latour, a 
‘matter of fact’ (henceforth MoFact) is firmly linked to a particular conception of ‘Scientific 
knowledge.’ Such ‘Scientific knowledge’ – an essential part of the post-enlightenment ‘modern 
constitution’ (Latour, 1993) – works by defining an objective nature. Latour deliberately gives 
this kind of ‘Science’ a capital ‘S’ to symbolise its power and to signal the way it closes down 
dissent and takes the place of politics in conventional decision-making fora. Latour suggests that 
such MoFact retain the power to render matter ‘mute’ and to make nature ‘incontestable’ 
(Latour, 2004:10). MoFact, in other words, work to stifle and deny politics, even in situations of 
controversy.  
To address this, Latour puts forward a new concept: ‘matters of concern. To conceptualise things 
as matters of concern (henceforth MoConcern) is to allow for the transformation of MoFact, 
impotent as they are in their Scientific form, into participatory ‘things’ that are lively and have 
agency.  
Latour’s proposition is that new collectives are needed to allow us to move away from Science 
towards a situation where – similar to within the HyFo – both lay and expert practitioners might 
engage in the making of knowledge. These new collectives would not be silenced by 
indisputable scientific ‘facts.’ Rather, they would become politically active in MoConcern. Non-
human ‘things’ would play a vital role (Latour 2004: 69), and be recognised as having the power 
to trigger ‘new occasions to passionately differ and dispute’ (Latour 2005b: 5). 
In the Parliament of Things (PoT), participants are not required (as Scientists are) to leave their 
attachments, passions and weaknesses at the door in favour of an imagined objectivity. All 
scientific and political participants of collectives have the unavoidable ‘disabilities’ of weakness, 
passion and attachment, Latour argues; it is impossible to adopt a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 
1986), or speak on behalf of the world objectively. We are all inherently ‘politically challenged’ 
and democracy demands we recognise this. Latour rhetorically asks, ‘Are we not, on the whole, 
totally disabled?’ (Latour 2005b: 20), and urges participants to embrace this ‘disability,’ rather 
than chase the ideal of becoming perfectly eloquent, enlightened and objective disembodied 
thinkers.  
Taken together, Acting in an Uncertain World, Politics of Nature and Making Things Public 
advocate a more open model for doing science, which is inclusive not just of wider human 
demos, but also the vitality of the non-human material world – recognising that matter matters – 
in the production of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, all participants in the new knowledge-
making collectives should acknowledge their own ‘constitutive attachments’ (Callon et al. 2009: 
265) or ‘disabilities’ (Latour 2005b: 20) as essential to the work of democratising democracy. 
So what does this mean in practice? In the next section, we describe how several simple 
principles drawn from these ANT ideas were adapted and utilised ‘in the wild’ (Callon et al 
2009: 104), that is, within a specific participatory collective that emerged in Loweswater, 
Cumbria, in the north of England.  
Section 2: ANT in the wild: a participatory experiment in Loweswater 
In 2004, a group of three ecologists working with farmers around a lake that was exhibiting 
deteriorating water quality invited two sociologists of science (Claire Waterton and Jake Morris) 
to join their team. At that time, the Loweswater Lake was subject to increasingly frequent and 
unpredictable ‘blooms’ of cyanobacteria, or ‘blue-green algae.’ Cyanobacteria are organisms that 
depend on, and are ‘limited by,’ high nutrient loads within lake water, typically attributed to farm 
run-off of fertiliser or animal excrement. These algae can be poisonous to animals and 
sometimes humans, and the deteriorating quality of the lake, situated within the popular Lake 
District National Park, was becoming an issue of public concern.  
The sociologists learned that, from the early 2000s onwards, scientists and environmental 
agencies had been monitoring the lake water using specified sampling methods to detect 
nutrients and to measure water flow. The data produced by this sampling would feed into a 
nutrient budget for the lake and contribute to a model that would enhance understanding of its 
thriving algal populations.  
Asking the ecologists about the water quality sampling they had been doing, the sociologists 
heard about the use of standard techniques, the importance of replicability and the necessity that 
sampling was ‘do-able’ for scientists. Asking farmers about water quality and the possibility of 
monitoring pollution, however, brought up very different issues. Firstly, farmers questioned the 
possibility of deriving an accurate picture of catchment processes from samples that are taken 
only once every month. Secondly, farmers asserted that the ecologists’ depth gauge was too far 
upstream of the lake to take into account the nutrient loading that four tributary streams were 
contributing. Thirdly, farmers spoke openly of the politics of monitoring. They knew that some 
of the issues in the lake concerned leaky farm infrastructures, but at the same time they felt that, 
for reasons of sensitivity, neither they nor the ecologists could realistically monitor these: ‘You 
couldn’t do samples outside of everyone’s slurry tanks…’ 
The controversy not only involved the politics of measurement. Whilst scientists were 
monitoring water quality under the observant eyes of farmers and local residents, cyanobacteria 
were ‘blooming’ with increasing frequency on the surface of the lake. When this happened, the 
surface of lake turned a lurid green and Loweswater farmers acutely felt the blame of those 
witnessing the unsightly blooms. They also felt the blame of the regulatory authorities – for 
example, the National Trust who owned the lake,3 the Lake District National Park Authority 
charged with preserving the beauty and health of the Cumbrian lakes and fells, and the 
Environment Agency (EA) responsible for good water quality nationally.  
This uncomfortable atmosphere of blame, rising in concert with the appearance of blue-green 
algae on the surface of the lake, was oddly associated with one of the most taken-for-granted 
trends in the UK countryside since the mid-19th century: The ongoing ‘agricultural 
improvements’ since the invention and widespread uptake of technologies such as field drains, 
mechanised farm machinery, artificial fertilisers and so on. Such improvements allowed for 
increases in the acreage of improved grassland on farms, increased livestock numbers per farm 
and an increase in the yields of pastures. What the algae began to vividly evoke, by the early 
2000s, it was a sense of the complex and unintended ecological and social consequences of these 
agricultural improvements which, in turn, engendered a tangible atmosphere of dismay, anger, 
stigma and shame.  
If a participatory forum was going to be developed around the issue of the blue-green algae at 
Loweswater, it needed to acknowledge entrenched positions involving hierarchies of knowledge 
and feelings of stigma and blame, and to provide a way to understand the human, non-human, 
economic, social, cultural, historical, emotional and political complexities in which all 
participants were implicated. 
A new collective 
The sociologists decided that a good way to respond to this situation might be to use some of the 
ANT participatory ideas outlined earlier. A new ‘Loweswater Knowledge Collective’ was 
proposed. This would be a PoT where it would be accepted that: 
- nature is not self-evident; 
- knowledge and expertise have to be debated;  
- uncertainty is the main condition humans are in (rather than a condition of having knowledge);  
- what is important is the creation of connections between people and things;  
- doubt and questioning are extended to all our representations. 
 
These principles were taken on board by participants from the very first full meeting of the new 
collective, which participants renamed the Loweswater Care Project (LCP) in June 2008.4 
Thereafter, evening meetings were held every two months, until December 2010. At each 
meeting, questions – about nature, knowledge, expertise, representations, uncertainty, etc. – were 
raised, and talks and investigations proposed by participants were given and discussed. Wide-
ranging issues were brought into the forum, including: The spawning grounds of brown trout; the 
use of household detergents in the valley; a recent piece of legislation, the European Water 
Framework Directive; the maintenance of the banks of streams around the lake; the existence of 
well-functioning and less well-functioning septic tanks; changing rainfall patterns; changing 
patterns of, and futures for, farming in Loweswater; and unexpected ecological relations in the 
de-oxygenated water of the lake.  
The simple principles referred to above were used to appraise and interrogate the large quantities 
of new information coming into the collective. These principles directly questioned the ‘natural’ 
and the ‘factual,’ thereby transforming MoFact into MoConcern. They allowed all participants to 
inquire, contest and unsettle established facts as a bona fide mode of engagement, freeing them 
from the previous necessity to assign responsibility and blame.  
Participants became inquisitive: Nature and natural processes were no longer taken as self-
evident; all claims to knowledge and expertise had to be debated; doubt and questioning, 
including doubt of scientific methods and monitoring, but also of lay claims and counterclaims, 
were encouraged and nurtured. The principles also helped the collective think about fact making 
and knowledge in more provisional ways, accepting the inevitability of uncertainty. They helped 
the collective build connections and create its own knowledge through a number of research 
investigations designed by participants themselves. 
For example, drawing on the idea that ‘nature is not self-evident,’ participants invited a 
representative of the UK State’s agency for water quality – the EA – to explain the classification 
of ‘moderate ecological status’ that had been designated for Loweswater. The designation of 
‘moderate’ as opposed to ‘good’ ecological status implied that the lake has a water quality 
‘problem.’ This invitation highlighted participants’ weaknesses and attachments; they admitted 
that they had little insight into the way in which this complex classification had been drawn up, 
and were also aware of the threat that ‘moderate ecological status’ implied for farmers, as 
breaching environmental regulations carried punitive financial consequences.  
The EA representative came to an evening meeting and described the way in which moderate 
status had been designated. She informed participants that four pieces of scientific evidence 
(regarding oxygen, plant life, algae and fish in the lake) were needed to make the designation. 
But as she came to the end of her talk, she admitted that the classification of ‘moderate status’ 
for Loweswater had been established with only three pieces of data, as the data on fish 
populations were missing. A heated debate ensued. A farmer intervened: 
Farmer: ‘Sounds like guesswork science to me…’ 
The EA representative was taken aback: ‘Sorry?’ 
The farmer reiterated: ‘Sounds like guesswork science to me…If one of these things [the four 
pieces of evidence] can knock it back to ‘poor’ and you can’t count the fish, you haven’t a hope, 
if fish is one of them!’ 
 
The farmer questioned the very basis on which the official designation had been given. Many 
participants in the room backed his reasoning. Not only the farmers, but also the scientists, were 
vulnerable now, with the EA representative acknowledging that there were ‘problems with the 
fish classification tool we are using.’ The ‘constitutive attachments’ of different participants 
were visible to all. Following the farmer’s questioning, participants learned, through fraught and 
difficult discussion, exactly what combination of nature and artifice was involved in designating 
the ecological status of Loweswater. In addition, investigating water quality as a MoConcern, as 
they did here, the collective also embraced the realm of emotion, feelings and affect. 
Affect is a complex term, but here denotes the ways ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’ are inherently and 
pre-personally immanent in the material world (Massumi 2002; McCormack 2003, 2010: 643). 
Affect is important. Discussions that took place in the collective were argumentative, passionate 
and moving. They exposed not only the vulnerabilities and attachments of participants but also 
their intelligence, inquisitiveness, creativity and sensitivity, and the emotional intensity of the 
forum had material consequences for the collective itself, the ‘things’ at its centre and the way in 
which its relationships were made.  
Section 3: An omission in the parliament: can we learn to worry about 
slurry through theories of care? 
The interactions of the LCP bring up an issue of vital importance for the dialogic experiment of 
the HyFo and PoT. Namely, that the attachments, weaknesses and passions that Latour 
encourages us to embrace on our entry into the parliament, just like things themselves, have 
agency. Embracing ‘disability’ is not simply a process of drily accepting that we all have 
bounded rationality. Disabilities have affective and relational consequences, and produce and 
demand particular configurations of labour and sensitivity from all members of the collective, 
having indelible effects on the potentiality of directions the collective may take. 
Think, for example, of the unwillingness (mentioned in section 2) to monitor farms’ individual 
slurry tanks, despite the widespread suspicion that these were important sources of nutrient 
pollution. Slurry – the liquid mixture of cattle excrement and water that arises as a result of 
certain kinds of cattle housing on beef and dairy farms – was considered to be one of several 
contributing factors to water enrichment in Loweswater, as it contains significant amounts of the 
nutrient phosphorus. However, the LCP never worked out precisely how to formulate questions 
around slurry, or how to investigate slurry production, storage and use as a fertiliser in the 
catchment. Within the pre-existing affective atmospheres of Loweswater, the toxic culture of 
blame that had been wrapped around the ‘objective’ presentation of water quality played an 
important part here. The desire of participants to move away from these negative relations, and 
the need to rebuild trust, played a significant role in the unfolding of the forum and the 
democratic decisions it made. 
This sense of affect steered how some issues were, and others not, opened out for scrutiny in the 
LCP, because of the difficult affectual atmospheres they contained. As one ecologist participant 
reflected: 
It may be that there are things…like slurry tank management, things that we haven’t directly 
challenged in this project that are a problem for some of the farmers. And you know, that is 
an issue.5 
The forum, it seemed, could not apprehend slurry without re-energising the pernicious spectre of 
blame that would shut down discussion entirely. 
Encompassing affect: from matters of concern to matters of care 
How can we make sense of our finding that disability mattered in Loweswater and that 
participants’ vulnerabilities had an effect? That attachments, weaknesses and passions didn’t just 
allow for open debate, but drove debate in certain directions at the expense of others?  
A useful resource for thinking with this is Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2017) Matters of Care: 
Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds. Here, Puig de la Bellacasa proposes that we 
extend the movement from MoFact to MoConcern by further conceptualising controversies as 
matters of care. A matter of care (MoCare) weaves Latour’s MoConcern into the rich history of 
thinking about care in feminist theory.  
To care, Puig de la Bellacasa reminds us, is a verb; it is ‘a necessary practice, a life-sustaining 
activity, an everyday constraint’ (2017: 160). Care is unavoidable, an inherent part of the 
necessary yet mostly dismissed labours of the everyday maintenance of life. Care circulates 
unequally, and is not innocent: Its labours fall more heavily on some shoulders, be they human or 
non-human, than others (the night worker, for example, who cleans the academic’s office, or the 
worms in soil that allow us to grow food). Caring for one thing can mean killing something else 
(as we dig up weeds in caring for gardens). As care is always happening, the important question 
we must ask is ‘What worlds are being maintained and at the expenses of which others?’ (Puig 
de la Bellacasa 2017: 44; see also Haraway 1994). Nothing holds together without a more-than-
human chain of care, and those relations are deeply situated. 
Circling back to Loweswater, can we understand the failure to open out the issue of slurry in the 
collective as a matter of care? Within the context of a historical situation of toxic blame, we can 
see participants attempting to balance care for the lake’s environmental status with care for local 
farmers, so long villainised by Science. The need for the group to care for other things (such as 
farmers’ emotional well-being) in order to ensure the parliament’s maintenance and survival 
worked to render slurry ‘mute’ as a ‘Ding.’ Did this ‘disable’ the collective in the act of caring 
for the polluted lake? Does that mean the forum was ineffective? In the short-term timescale of 
‘traditional’ political decision-making, yes. But as Callon et al. (2009) take care to mention, 
hybrid fora and their attachments and entanglements take time and are iterative. The LCP 
developed, in time, into another community-run participatory forum, the Loweswater Care 
Programme, working in partnership with the West Cumbria Rivers Trust. As part of this, 
significant progress was made on tacking ‘point source pollution’ from leaky slurry tanks in the 
valley.6 
A parliament for slurry: fact, concern or care? 
Slurry, then, was a troublesome ‘ding’ in Loweswater, and in 2016, the current authors had the 
opportunity to encounter it again, via a call made by a partnership organisation, SARIC (the 
Sustainable Agriculture Research and Innovation Club), to study (deep breath) ‘the provision of 
decision-support on organic slurry storage and treatment techniques to enhance nutrient use 
efficiencies.’ 
The assumption of the research call was that farmers needed to take better heed of scientific 
knowledge in their slurry management decisions. This was very much embedded in the ‘modern 
constitution’ of Nature/Science that Latour has critiqued. The ‘issue’ to be ‘solved’ was not 
slurry as a material entity, or the nature–culture practices entangled within it, but farmers’ 
‘inefficient’ and unscientific decisions, the ‘fix’ for which – a ‘decision support’ tool – was 
decidedly technical. 
As we got to know the material-semiotic landscape in which the research project was positioned, 
it became apparent that a semi-stable assemblage existed around the slurry controversy. This 
consisted of many MoFact: Devices for establishing water quality status (such as those we met in 
Loweswater), agronomic science determining crop nutrient uptake, and policy guiding and 
enforcing farmers’ activities. Importantly, this assemblage also included a huge number of 
experts (scientists, policymakers and agricultural advisors) labouring to improve the status of 
freshwaters in the UK, to care for the environment. 
However, this assemblage was not achieving its intended aim, so tweaking was considered 
necessary. As one soil scientist put it: ‘There are really good decision support tools out there, 
but a significant number of people don’t engage…We need to identify the barriers to engaging 
with this information.’ Within this Science-based chain of care, the ‘problem farmer’ was the 
weak link, making poor decisions with slurry on farm. If the problem farmer would change, the 
assemblage could achieve their two priorities of maximising agricultural output and achieving 
‘good’ environmental status. Our expected role as social scientists in the proposed project was to 
produce the knowledge necessary to manage this ‘problem farmer,’ in the same way that Science 
allows us to manage Nature. 
Of course, this positioning was deeply problematic, particularly from an ethical point of view. 
We therefore attempted to open up space within the research (which we called ‘Slurry-Max’) to 
let farmers – and slurry – speak.7 This process revealed a very different reality to that of the 
‘problem farmer’ not understanding their ‘valuable resource.’ We learned that slurry was 
unpredictable, powerful and dangerous. There was usually too much of it when wet weather and 
ground conditions made it a pollutant, and not enough when they allowed it to be a fertiliser. Its 
qualities were variable, and didn’t fit neatly into the ‘book values’ denoted by agronomic science 
(the averages that make up official estimates of the nutrient content of slurry, which had huge 
standard deviations). Farmers, far from being uninformed, understood this well, giving 
considered reasons as to why they couldn’t follow the scientific advice. In short, ‘the thing’ of 
slurry, voiced through Slurry-Max’s empirical work with the material itself and with those that 
were working daily with it,8 turned out to be very different from the concept of slurry that was 
embedded within the science-policy assemblage and the SARIC research call. 
Section 4: Democracy in the wild 
How could ANT thinking on participation help the researchers in this scenario? It was clear from 
the beginning that we would not have the freedom to establish a slurry HyFo or PoT. And even 
had we wanted to, the huge national scale of the ‘nutrient management’ science-policy 
assemblage would make that problematic. ‘Slurry’ as a ‘thing’ at this scale is too much, too 
diffused and too varied to truly be granted due process – the ‘ding’ loses the advantage of a 
position in the PoT. The HyFo and PoT, we found, can be difficult to achieve within the pre-
existing assemblages – operating at pre-existing scales – which maintain our ongoing worlds.  
So, must we give up on the idea of participation under circumstances where the democratic 
conditions of the HyFo or PoT cannot be achieved, and layperson ‘publics’ and non-human 
things are not procedurally afforded due process? Should the Slurry-Max researchers have turned 
away from ANT, and provided the assemblage with the means to ‘tame’ the problem farmer, as 
they had been asked to do? 
Of course, the answer is no. But how can we move beyond the privileged space of the HyFo and 
PoT, to create the conditions for an expanded ‘technical democracy’ in the wild? We can find 
some answer to this by returning to Matters of Care (2017). Puig de la Bellacasa stresses that, 
unlike the HyFo and PoT, care is not a ‘recipe’ for doing our encounters (2017: 90), but rather a 
trope that we can use to think through a non-normative politics of knowledge. She writes that 
this is ‘always specific; it cannot be enacted by a priori moral disposition, nor an epistemic 
stance, nor a set of applied techniques, nor elicited as abstract effect’ (ibid: 90). 
In the messy, imperfect fora in which most contemporary politics play out, such a standpoint can 
aid us in seeking a better democracy. If, as Puig de la Bellacasa suggests, we think of care as the 
ongoing, unavoidable labour whereby some worlds are maintained at the expenses of others, it is, 
of course, inevitable that we are constantly, in every act, doing politics. Considering this, we 
should perhaps move beyond thinking of participation as procedural politics, choreographed 
within bespoke ‘hybrid fora,’ and instead consider it as embedded within ongoing patterns of 
taking part. This implies that participation becomes a kind of unevenly distributed process of 
inclusion and exclusion, choice, care and labour, which is inherent to all our collective activities. 
Applying this to the problem of slurry management, we can see that the proposed SARIC project 
expected the most of, and listened the least to, two actors: Small farmers and slurry. Our concern 
as social scientists was then to attempt to ‘democratise democracy’ by amplifying the voices of 
these actors in the fora of the assemblage. In Slurry-Max, the researchers attempted to achieve 
this by close interrogation of the existing assemblage of care around nutrient management, 
tracing which participants – both human and non-human – were in danger of being objectified or 
silenced, or bearing an unreasonable burden of care. Then, we attempted in our own actions of 
world-making to respectfully ameliorate these conditions, drawing attention to which worlds 
were being supported and made, and at the expenses of which others.  
In this way, we acknowledge that we are acting in a world where fully democratic cosmopolitical 
parliaments are not always possible – or at least, are always inherently bounded. We suggest that 
one way forward could be to think beyond participation as a discrete idea – or as something that 
can absolutely and procedurally be ‘achieved’ – and instead, attempt to live, as world-makers, 
with inclusionary care at the centre of our doings. 
Politics in the contemporary world can sometimes seem a million miles from the ideal of the 
more-than-human democracy of the PoT. But that doesn’t mean we have to give up on the work 
of democratising democracy. In a parliament in which we are all partial and disabled, it’s vital to 
remember that this means all participants require care. By thinking about participation as an 
active process of taking care within the parliaments we are already part of, we can work towards 
participatory futures beyond the privileged space of a HyFo, and, disabled as we are, strive for a 
better world for all. 
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